AI paper index

Truthful AI Advisors: A Pre-Specified Benchmark for Large Language Model Honesty Under Preference Misalignment

2026-05-31 · arXiv: 2606.01456

One-line summary

An AI research paper on Truthful AI Advisors: A Pre-Specified Benchmark for Large Language Model Honesty Under Preference Misalignment.

Engineering notes

Engineering notes will be added by the aipentium editorial team.

Chinese explanation / 中文解读

中文解读待补充:本站会优先为大语言模型、生成式AI、ChatGPT相关技术、计算机视觉、深度学习等高价值论文补充中文说明。

Original abstract

Large language models are increasingly deployed as advisors whose objective is not aligned with the user's: recommenders optimize for engagement, sales assistants for purchases, negotiation agents for concessions. Whether such advisors stay truthful when honesty conflicts with their own payoff is a core alignment-evaluation question. We turn the canonical Crawford-Sobel cheap-talk model into a pre-specified benchmark for LLM honesty under preference misalignment. Cheap-talk theory predicts neither full revelation nor silence but coarse monotone partitions, with fewer informative intervals as preference conflict grows. A sender observes a state omega in [0,1], wants the receiver's action near omega+b, and sends one costless message to a receiver whose ideal action is omega. The design uses 5 bias levels, 3 prompt frames, a fixed low-temperature setting, and 200 states per cell: 12,000 sender calls. For the positive-bias grid b in {0.01,0.04,0.08,0.12} the exact most-informative partition sizes are 7,4,3,2, with oracle normalized mutual information 0.5294, 0.3268, 0.2205, 0.1829. Running the full design on four instruction-tuned models (GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite, Llama-3.3-70B), we find all four over-reveal relative to the most-informative equilibrium by 1.8 to 4.2x: normalized mutual information stays at 0.78-0.94 where the oracle prescribes 0.18-0.53. Informativeness declines with bias as predicted but never approaches the strategic optimum; rather than coarse partitions, models show near-full revelation with a constant upward offset tracking their bias (linear exaggeration). Payoff-maximizing versus honesty framing has negligible effect. A decoder ablation shows the finding is recoverable only when the receiver reads the sender's stated number: an embedding-only decoder mis-reads the same data as near-babbling.

5.0Engineering value
7.0Research novelty
4.0Business relevance

Links and sources

Need this topic turned into a technical roadmap?

aipentium can prepare a custom AI literature review, code map, dataset map, and B2B technology assessment.

Request B2B AI research

Comments

No comments yet. Be the first to share your thoughts on this paper.
Login or register to leave a comment