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SysEvolve: An AI-native, safe, autonomous adversarial attack-defense co-evolutionary system

2026-08-15 · arXiv: 2608.15012

One-line summary

An AI research paper on SysEvolve: An AI-native, safe, autonomous adversarial attack-defense co-evolutionary system.

Engineering notes

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Chinese explanation / 中文解读

中文解读待补充:本站会优先为大语言模型、生成式AI、ChatGPT相关技术、计算机视觉、深度学习等高价值论文补充中文说明。

Original abstract

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a growing asymmetry in cybersecurity, where attack accelerates toward autonomous execution while defense remains predominantly human-intensive. Despite substantial prior work across cyber ranges, AI-driven attack, and AI-driven defense, this asymmetry persists. We trace it to a deeper root cause, that evolution itself has stalled on both sides at three layers. To overcome this, we propose co-evolution as the integrating insight, where attack and defense AI agents autonomously and safely drive each other's evolution through adversarial confrontation. Based on this insight, we present \sysevolve, comprising three co-designed components, \sysfield, \sysspear, and \sysarmor. \sysfield constructs realistic multi-host ranges. \sysspear generates efficient, safe attack schemes. \sysarmor performs real-time, interpretable defense. Together they form a self-driven adversarial loop restoring evolution at all three layers. In evaluation, \sysfield achieves zero-loss collection at 2.1\% overhead and orchestrates 257 CVEs into 1,148 ranges, \sysspear improves attack success by over 25\% over baseline LLMs, and \sysarmor achieves 10--1000$\times$ greater precision than prior systems and detects real APT attacks in production at Huawei and Sangfor. Our evaluation also reveals three findings about LLM agent capabilities. First, multi-step composition and larger topologies expose agent capability gaps hidden by single-step evaluations. Second, the bottleneck lies after initial access in post-compromise state utilization. Third, LLM agents are susceptible to environmental interference. When decoy endpoints are deployed in the range, agent timeouts triple and downstream completion disappears despite the success rates of initial accesses are unchanged.

5.0Engineering value
7.0Research novelty
4.0Business relevance

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