'Ghaib in Translation' aka Unseen Harm: Measuring Cross-Script Safety Inconsistency with 'Missed-in-Urdu' Scores in LLM Hate Speech Detection

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Original abstract

Urdu, the world's tenth most spoken language with 246 million speakers, remains almost entirely absent from mainstream LLM safety evaluation and nine years of WOAH proceedings. To investigate whether this absence has measurable consequences for content moderation reliability, five large language models, GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Qwen-2.5, and Llama-3.1, were tested across six datasets spanning Nastaliq Urdu, Roman Urdu, English, and code-switched Urdu-English. Across the five Urdu-script datasets, label instability between original-script and English-translation classification ranged from 15.9% (Gemini 2.5 Flash) to 31.6% (Qwen-2.5), with a 'Missed-in-Urdu' rate, content flagged as harmful in English translation but passed as normal in the original script, ranging from 2.4% to 9.9% (median 4.3%). A complete enumeration of all 205 papers across nine ALW/WOAH editions via the ACL Anthology API confirms zero dedicated Urdu papers across the entire period. Results indicate that current LLMs provide uneven safety assurance across Urdu's script varieties, with smaller open-weight models showing substantially higher instability and missed-harm rates than frontier closed models.

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• Official / arXiv page
• PDF from original source

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